

## JENKINS CORRESPONDENCE WITH MOUNTBATTEN ON PUNJAB IN 1947

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### Abstract

*Jenkins correspondence with Mountbatten is very important from the point of view of the topic of this research. In-depth analysis of the telegrams, fortnightly reports, letters and finally memoranda, help us in understanding the actual situation behind the scene. It clearly depicts the callous approach of the British towards the Indians. When actually they had to decide something, they shirked from their responsibilities. Mountbatten's, Jenkins's and Commander-in-Chief Field Marshal Claude Auchinleck's main concern was to send home safely their own forces and citizens. The British ranks and files were tired and exhausted after the Second World War and communal affairs had taxed their endurance level to the hilt. However, the British would not like to accept who actually brought India to this conflagration. They laid all blame on the shoulders of Muslim and non-Muslim communal groups. The other factor on which they had focused their attention was to keep the new states in the Commonwealth of Nations. Mountbatten was dealing with Nehru and Jinnah quite tactfully. Jinnah was adamant to secure separate homeland for the Muslims, but he was given a truncated Pakistan. Nehru demanded united India. Mountbatten showed him the glimpse of India after transfer of power in an early draft, which depicted India as fragmented. Nehru was flabbergasted. To cool him down V.P.Menon was invited at Mashobra (Kashmir) and the new plan was drafted. With hindsight, it seemed that Mountbatten was trying to keep the two leaders under his influence by showing them the bleaker side of the picture if they did not act on his advice.*

### Key words

Mountbatten, Punjab, Partition, Jenkins, India

The correspondence between Jenkins and Mountbatten clearly mentions the obvious bloodshed that is likely to occur with division of Punjab, the Mountbatten latter acted as if he was not aware or warned about the carnage.

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Evan Meredith Jenkins (1896-1985) was the last Governor of the United Punjab (April 1946-August 1947). Lord Ismay, who was Lord Mountbatten's Chief of Staff told him at a lunch time meeting organized by London Royal Empire Society, that while in London he had felt that the date fixed, June 1948, was "far too early." When he reached Delhi, he found that it was "too late". The Administration was creaking; "the communal bitterness was far too intense both at headquarter in Delhi and in the provinces than anything he [Ismay] could have imagined".<sup>1</sup>

In a letter to Wavell, the Punjab Governor wrote that he was fully aware of the province's adverse situation. He thought no stable government in the Punjab was possible then unless there was agreement at the Centre.<sup>2</sup>

Jenkins correspondence with Mountbatten is very important from the point of view of the topic of this research. In-depth analysis of the telegrams, fortnightly reports, letters and finally memoranda, help us in understanding the actual situation behind the scene. It clearly depicts the callous approach of the British towards the Indians. When actually they had to decide something, they shirked their responsibilities. Mountbatten's, Jenkins's and Commander-in-Chief Field Marshal Claude Auchinleck's main concern was to send home safely their own forces and citizens. The British ranks and files were tired and exhausted after the Second World War and communal affairs had taxed their endurance level to the hilt. However, the British would not like to accept who actually brought India to this conflagration. They laid all blame on the shoulders of Muslim and non-Muslim communal groups. The other factor on which they had focused their attention was to keep the new states in the Commonwealth of Nations. Mountbatten was dealing with Nehru and Jinnah quite tactfully. Jinnah was adamant to secure separate homeland for the Muslims, but he was given a truncated Pakistan. Nehru demanded united India. Mountbatten showed him the glimpse of India after transfer of power in an early draft, which depicted India as fragmented. Nehru was flabbergasted. To cool him down V.P. Menon was invited at Mashobra (Kashmir) and the new plan was drafted.<sup>3</sup> With hindsight, it seemed that Mountbatten was trying to keep the two leaders under his influence by showing them the bleaker side of the picture if they did not act on his advice. They effectively used the carrot and stick policy that the powerful countries follow to coerce the third world countries even to this day.

### **Correspondence and Letters**

From March to August 1947, Jenkins wrote in detail to Mountbatten about the communal violence in Punjab. He not only gave

fortnightly reports but also sent telegrams to inform Mountbatten of the deteriorating situation. Jenkins wrote 25 letters, sent 12 telegrams, 5 fortnightly reports and a memorandum. Mountbatten manipulated these reports to absolve himself of any blame for the violence in India. One glaring example of this manipulation was not making public the Radcliffe Award, that, he was sure to cause an outburst when the gerrymandering of the boundaries was found. Nine districts that were Gurdaspur, Ajnala, Hoshiarpur, Dasuya, Nakodar, Jullundur, Ludhiana, Ferozpur, and Zira<sup>4</sup> were shifted from one side to the other with one stroke of the pen without caring for the horror that this stroke would wreak.

Prime Minister Attlee had told the cabinet that the first sign of trouble should be promptly and ruthlessly crushed even using excessive force including tanks and aircrafts.<sup>5</sup> Mountbatten had also reiterated that in the same words. However, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad doubted Mountbatten's sincerity in that respect. He wrote, "The whole world knows what the result of Lord Mountbatten's brave declaration was". Large-scale killing followed partition. Innocent men, women, and children were massacred. The Indian army was divided communally and nothing could be done to stop the murder of innocent Hindus and Muslims.<sup>6</sup>

In those letters, we observe that the promises did not match at all, with what actually happened. Mountbatten was a scion of the royal family and he was very much particular about his own success. He wanted to exit India in triumph. However, he lacked that element of honesty that his job required. He was more obsessed with avenging the insult he thought he was subjected to by Jinnah when he refused him the honour of becoming Governor General of Pakistan. In addition, his wife's friendship with Nehru also proved detrimental to the interests of Muslims. He told her he wanted Kashmir to be part of India. Mountbatten could not deny his wife whom he had used so often as a bridge

for cordial relations with Nehru.<sup>7</sup>

..... India Hicks daughter of Pamela [Pamela daughter of Mountbatten] wrote about her grandfather in the book *India Remembered* "foreword" "It is hard for me to imagine my grandfather, only a few years older than I am now, being asked to dismantle an empire. Un-imaginable the responsibility of checking the tide of violence and controlling cities that were committing suicide. It is not hard, however to imagine that from the moment my grandparents arrived, he rejected all the Raj stereotypes and looked towards the job with open mind. It is also

understandable that, despite all royal ties, my grandfather was a tough-minded realist, committed to those liberal principles, which made him acceptable to Attlee's Labour party.<sup>8</sup>

This practice of writing letters to report on provincial affairs to the Viceroy and other high officials such as Secretary of State of India started during the First World War.<sup>9</sup> Jenkins acted on the instructions he received in response to his messages and sometimes used his own discretion in tackling a given situation. In this article, the contents of Jenkin's letters to Mountbatten are investigated. There are letters that are not included in *Transfer of Power* volumes, but are part of Jenkins papers available at National Documentation Centre (NDC), Islamabad, Microfilms Collection.

British leadership always preferred the Hindu majority to minorities like Muslims and Sikhs. That was despite the fact that in the Second World War those two communities had laid down their lives to defend the honour of Union Jack. In return, the Muslims were rewarded with a truncated Pakistan and a simmering Kashmir problem. The Sikhs did not get the homeland they demanded and lost their holy places.

Mountbatten arrived in Delhi on 22<sup>nd</sup> March, 1947. Jenkins in his first letter to Mountbatten narrated the law and order situation in Punjab. He informed him about the Punjab Disturbed Area Act, 1947; and the Punjab Disturbed Areas (Special Power of Armed Forces) Ordinance 1947 that had authorised the use of extreme force against persons who in a disturbed area disobey orders. The orders were prohibiting gatherings of five or more persons, or the carrying of weapons etc.<sup>10</sup> Mountbatten took notice of Jenkins' concerns and gave him permission to enforce law in the crisis.<sup>11</sup>

Jenkins in his fortnightly report to Mountbatten wrote that the situation was under control. He informed Mountbatten of the political situation in his province and about the differences between the main political entities -- Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs. He also informed him about the factors that were behind the spread of communal virus that had disturbed the political, agricultural and economic life in the Punjab.<sup>12</sup>

### **Events in April 1947**

Jenkins informed Mountbatten that eight villages, four Muslim and four Hindu were burned down. As a result of which ten Hindus were killed. Although police had been stationed in major villages to control any untoward incidence,<sup>13</sup> however Jenkins complained about communication difficulties.

Jenkins updated Mountbatten about the political situation in the province. He wrote to Mountbatten that there was then little doubt that some Sikh leaders were preparing for violent agitation against the Muslims in the Punjab. He also attached two documents in *Gurmukhi*..

1. One pamphlet gave a grossly exaggerated account of the events in the Rawalpindi division,
2. The second was an appeal duly signed by 18 Sikhs, including Sardar Baldev Singh for contributions to what appeared to be a “war fund” amounting to fifty lakh rupees.

During the Governor’s Conference in Delhi on 16<sup>th</sup> April, Mountbatten inquired from Baldev Singh, the Defence Minister, in the presence of Jenkins about the Sikh War Fund. But Baldev denied being the treasurer of the war fund that had issued the appeal.<sup>14</sup>

Both documents were an appeal for help in cash and kind as a preliminary preparation against the Muslims. Jenkins seemed to justify those preparations as he thought the Sikhs were justified in preparing themselves against the Muslims. Apparently, it was a lapse, on the part of British administrators that ignited killing and arson in major areas of Punjab.<sup>15</sup>

The duty of administrators was to use force and respond appropriately to pre-empt an uprising but Jenkins took no action against arsonists and hence the result was total chaos, wanton killings and lawlessness. It was of utmost urgency that Jenkins should have identified areas of trouble and doused the flames of hatred well in time. It seemed that he used his office at the end of the British Empire to transfer that problem of his making to future governments of Punjab. According to Leonard Mosley, Jenkins and the high command in Delhi knew very well the plans of massacre and disruption in Punjab well before time but they preferred to look the other way. This was mainly due to weariness, or may be lack of foresight, or to avert another clash with Jinnah but this slackness, if it was actually so, was disastrous for Punjab.<sup>16</sup>

In a note of 4<sup>th</sup> April Jenkins wrote that the Muslim League would sweep the polls if general elections were held and would easily grab 90 seats but it would hardly bring any change as Hindus and Sikhs would rebel. The communal tussle grew with the unrest and disturbances in Punjab.<sup>17</sup> Jenkins visited Gurgaon and mentioned how Hindu Ahirs, Jats and Gujars had united against the Muslim Meos and were burning down each other’s villages. Four villages were set to fire in Alwar State on the night of 4<sup>th</sup> and 5<sup>th</sup> April. Police and three battalions of armed forces were deployed to restore order.<sup>18</sup>

Mountbatten took notice of Jenkins letter’s third paragraph dated 9<sup>th</sup> April 1947. He [Jenkins] had written that it would be

injudicious to attack the Sikhs as the Sikhs had valid reasons for resentment against Muslims. Mountbatten consulted Jinnah in order to ease this tense situation. Jinnah proposed a meeting between Viceroy Mountbatten, Governor Jenkins and Mamdot. The Viceroy agreed and issued instructions to Jenkins to arrange for the meeting.<sup>19</sup>

Jenkins told the Governor's conference held at the Viceroy's House in New Delhi on 16<sup>th</sup> April, 1947 about "Operation Solomon" for the Punjab and suggested the possibility of appointing a statistical boundary commission.<sup>20</sup>

Mountbatten took the situation seriously. Jenkins had warned him that if partition was imposed on the Punjab, it would take four army divisions of army from outside the province to restore order.<sup>21</sup> Again, in his fortnightly report Jenkins narrated to Mountbatten the killings of Muslims and Hindus, which began in Gurgaon and had spread to other areas of Punjab like Alwar State and Amritsar. He updated him on the burning of the wheat crop and property for which the rioters were making use of crude soda-bottle petrol bombs. Local people had erected barriers to block entrance to *mohallas* and streets for protection. Since the Sikhs were carrying their traditional weapon, the Kirpan, in public as a show of strength, the Muslims demanded that they also be allowed to carry swords. But this was not allowed though Jenkins agreed that this was their right.<sup>22</sup>

Jenkins also mentioned that the Muslim League was anxious to form the ministry as they considered it to be their right and if the province was not divided they declared they would treat the non-Muslims with generosity.<sup>23</sup>

Mountbatten wrote to Jenkins about his meeting with Jinnah on 23 April 1947. They had talked about Punjab and the imposition of sections of India Act 93 which Jinnah had not agreed to however Mr Jinnah suggested that Mountbatten should discuss the matter of the ministry with Mamdot directly and involve Jenkins only after they had met.<sup>24</sup>

### **Jenkins and Mountbatten on Technicalities of Government of India Act 1935**

Jenkins had written to Mountbatten on 30<sup>th</sup> April that he was not satisfied about Mamdot's majority as some of his (Mamdot) supporters might be unreliable. Jenkins emphasised that once any large section of the population declined to recognize a parliamentary majority, it would become impossible to run a constitutional government. Jenkins said that the Government of India Act 1935 could not be worked by a communal Ministry in the Punjab and

constitutionally it was a delicate matter.<sup>25</sup> Jenkins contemplated whether the revolutionary situation that existed at the time justified the refusal to lift Section 93 or not. He thought it would be foolish to permit the formation of a ministry when an important announcement about the future of India was imminent. Jenkins agreed with Mountbatten that he (Jenkins) should handover the reply to Mamdot personally and explain it to him that Mountbatten would be glad to meet him in Delhi.<sup>26</sup>

The violence in Punjab in early 1947 was not all senseless as it was in fact a clash over territorial rights. Indeed the violence in Lahore and Amritsar in March and April 1947 made the Punjab partition acceptable.<sup>27</sup>

### **Transfer of Population Questioned**

In a meeting on 11<sup>th</sup> May, Mountbatten asked Jenkins if he had chalked out any plan for the transfer of population Jenkins admitted he had not so far.<sup>28</sup>

Jenkins met Mountbatten in the presence of Mievill, Lieutenant Colonel Erskine Crum he was asked about the solution of Punjab Province, Jenkins told them frankly that there was no easy solution for Punjab; civil war was imminent, if efforts were made to keep Muslim power in position then Sikhs and Hindus were likely to react...<sup>29</sup>

### **Tara Singh Refusal to attend Peace Meeting**

In the fortnightly report of 15<sup>th</sup> May 1947, Jenkins reviewing violent activities in the province mentioned Tara Singh's refusal to meet him for peace talks to which Muslims were also been invited. There was curfew in the walled city of Lahore; "*Jor Mela*" that the Sikhs observed on 23<sup>rd</sup> May in the memory of Guru Arjan Singh, who was killed in the reign of Emperor Jehangir in 1606 had been cancelled. Jenkins wrote that when some Muslim League leaders visited Lahore city to persuade the Muslims to refrain from violence, however those leaders had to retreat unceremoniously.<sup>30</sup>

All communities were arming themselves. A fine of Rs 30 lakh was imposed on the Muslims for killing non-Muslims in Rawalpindi. The fine was an attempt to compensate and pacify the non-Muslims to some extent.<sup>31</sup>

Jenkins in a telegram to Mountbatten on 16<sup>th</sup> May 1947 said there were no reports from Amritsar though the situation there was tense.<sup>32</sup> Mountbatten sympathized with Jenkins and assured him he was persuading the leaders of Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs to calm down.

He appreciated the hard work of Jenkins and wished him success before he left for London [to talk about the partition plan with Prime Minister Attlee]. Mountbatten approved the strict measures taken by Jenkins such as the cancellation of “*Jor Mela*”. The action against “Dawn” correspondent [who wrote an article for *Dawn* (Dehli) and *Pakistan Times* (Lahore) in which he criticized Punjab government, of the grossest partiality and had unsavoury comments for an Indian Act article 93 under which the Punjab government was administered] and the imposition of collective fine on Muslims of Rawalpindi district.<sup>33</sup>

Mountbatten spoke to Baldev Singh about Tara Singh’s refusal to cooperate with Muslim leaders in provincial government’s efforts to deal with disturbances. Tara Singh believed that the Muslims threatened his life and he refused to meet them. However, Sikh leaders like Baldev Singh, the Raja of Patiala and Faridkot promised to keep their people calm and peaceful.<sup>34</sup>

Mountbatten authorized Jenkins to use force if required to quell the communal riots and told him that the cabinet had approved it. Mountbatten extended full support to Jenkins in this matter.<sup>35</sup>

In his report of 26<sup>th</sup> May 1947, Jenkins was critical of people who were advising harsh measures to curb rioting. He said, “The Hitlerian method would be to take hostages and to shoot them, and I could no doubt improve the situation remarkably by shooting all the members of the High Commands. He did not however, himself recommend action of that kind, which equated the innocent with the guilty.”<sup>36</sup>

In a telegram to Mountbatten Jenkins mentioned about the dead and wounded in Lahore. He said that the situation was difficult to control especially the fires that the culprits used to start with missiles.<sup>37</sup>

### **Involvement of Faridkot House in Lahore Violence**

In a letter to Mountbatten, Jenkins wrote about an attack launched between 0300 and 0400 hours on 18<sup>th</sup> May 1947 on Gujjar residents on the suspicion that the Faridkot House in Lahore was involved in the killing of Muslims. The vehicles used in the crime were seen moving in and out of that house the night before.

Jenkins informed about his action against the Faridkot government. He had asked the Raja of Faridkot to produce the Station Wagon which destroyed the control post, its driver, passengers and also all other vehicles which were in Lahore during the previous 48 hours.

The Raja of Faridkot was instructed not to send any vehicles into Lahore without the specific permission of Punjab Government; they were forewarned that if those instructions were not complied with



at once and if they refused to assist in the process of investigation, most drastic action would be taken against the Raja of Faridkot.<sup>38</sup>

### **Deteriorating Condition in Lahore**

Jenkins was concerned about the deteriorating situation of law and order in Lahore. He kept the High Command at Delhi informed about the worsening situation of his province. A telegram to Mountbatten on 19<sup>th</sup> May, in which he said that things were worse and on the verge of a civil war, organized Sikh gangs were attacking Muslims, in it he gave the exact figures of the casualties and the incendiary cases.<sup>39</sup>

Jenkins wrote to Mountbatten about 10 men of Nabha State entering Lahore armed with rifles, stein guns and 900 round of ammunition. Since they were violating orders against carrying of arms, they were disarmed and their weapons confiscated. Jenkins considered it necessary to prevent armed personnel entering Lahore.<sup>40</sup> Police searched the Orthodox Hindus, as there were reports that the Punjab Relief Committee had distributed arms among them.<sup>41</sup> He also narrated Amritsar's deteriorating circumstances.<sup>42</sup>

Jenkins' telegram of 28<sup>th</sup> May 1947 to Mountbatten indicated that Lahore had suffered only one casualty (not fatal) that day but there were four more fires. In Amritsar, five persons were injured by gunshots. In Gurgaon, 15 villages were torched on May 27<sup>th</sup> alone in spite of troops being deployed there. Meanwhile there were reports of stabbings and fires from Ludhiana, Gurdaspur, Montgomery, Lyallpur, Muzaffargarh districts. There were fears of very serious disturbances after the June announcement, which increased the prevailing tension.<sup>43</sup> In a letter dated 29<sup>th</sup> May, 1947 Jenkins reported four killed and six injured on 28<sup>th</sup> and four dead and two injured with four incidences of fires on 29<sup>th</sup>.

Gurgaon was reported calm; however, Meos did extensive damage to villages on Tauru Hattin line, apparently in revenge for earlier atrocities by Hindus. No detailed report was received from Deputy Commissioners. Lyallpur was reported quiet, however, incidences were reported from many districts and there was apprehension about the June announcement. Migration had started and a number of families left Amritsar and arrived in Lahore.<sup>44</sup>

In a Telegram to the Viceroy on 31<sup>st</sup> May, Jenkins wrote, Muslims seemed determined to clear Hindus and Sikhs from their midst in Lahore. He deployed three companies of troops in the city but the situation could not be brought under control. In some places, fires were started right under the nose of the police. Stabbing incidences were fewer but uncontrollable. Jenkins wrote that fires were difficult to

control due to narrow streets and inadequate water supply and that he was trying to get trailer pumps. He stressed the need for more police, troops and speedier justice.<sup>45</sup>

### **June 1947 Punjab Voted for Partition**

By the end of June 1947, the Provincial assemblies of Bengal and the Punjab had voted for partition. Mountbatten never doubted that this was a prescription for disaster, acceptable only because no alternative was conceivable. As for Punjab, that was in a worse situation at the time Jenkins wrote that "An agreed partition of Punjab appears to be impossible".<sup>46</sup>

Jenkins was thankful to Mountbatten for the arrangement of a car for the trip to Gurgaon where he met Brendon and Patel. Jenkins recorded all the changes that were then occurring in India in 1947 and said a revolution was in progress. At Gurgaon, there were only 365 soldiers, which Jenkins thought were not enough for a district. They had talks with Sikhs at Sohna where they discussed administrative matters about Gurgaon.<sup>47</sup>

There were serious disturbances in Amritsar between the night of 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> June. There were fires and communal rioting in which both Muslims and non-Muslims were using firearms. Police and troops had to resort to firing several times.

There was no report from Gurgaon. The raid by Meos into Muttra District reported by the Governor of U.P. was apparently in retaliation of attacks by Muttra Hindus. There was no change in the general condition, which remained most unsatisfactory.<sup>48</sup> Gurgaon disorders remained widespread and people were resentful. As many as 60 villages were burnt down. Casualties were unknown as parties removed the dead and injured. The known number of the dead was 100 including 63, who were hospitalized. Meanwhile, the provincial government to control the situation called additional troops.

The partition plan had a mixed reaction. In Lahore and Amritsar, Hindus accepted it while Sikhs and Muslims were angry and critical of their leaders. Muslims threatened to destroy Amritsar and reaction from other districts was not then reported.<sup>49</sup>

### **3<sup>rd</sup> June Plan and its reaction in Punjab**

Mountbatten had made it clear that partition would not be later than 15<sup>th</sup> August 1947. Secondly, the British statement provided a procedure whereby the Punjab Legislative Assembly would meet in two parts, one representing the Muslim majority districts and the other the rest of the Province. If a simple majority of either part decided in favour of partition, then division would take place. Finally, it was

announced that as soon as the decision in favour of partition was made, a Boundary Commission would be set up to demarcate the boundaries of the two parts of the Punjab based on ascertaining the contiguous majority areas of Muslims and non-Muslims. The Commission would also be instructed to take into account 'other factors'. There was no doubt that the provisions of the Mountbatten Plan would lead to the partition of the Punjab. On 23<sup>rd</sup> June, the East Punjab members of the Legislative Assembly (representing the non-Muslim majority districts) voted 50 to 22 in favour of partition.<sup>50</sup>

The Hindus in the west and Muslims in the eastern part were dissatisfied but Congress and Muslim League both claimed that the plan was a masterstroke of their respective leaders. The Sikhs pinned their faith on the Boundary Commission and declared that they wanted the Chenab River as the western boundary. Jenkins wrote that the Muslim League could face a minor revolt against Jinnah, which he would probably suppress with ease.<sup>51</sup>

Before their departure from India, the British made sure of the division of India and the division of two major provinces where Muslims had an overall majority. They divided the two as the Western and Eastern parts. The Punjab Governor confided to Sardar Swaran Singh on 31<sup>st</sup> May that if it came about, he "would of course do what I could to see that everyone, including the Sikhs, to get a fair deal." It was not easy for him to prove.<sup>52</sup>

Reporting the law and order situation Jenkins wrote to Mountbatten that in Lahore police injured one person when he broke the curfew order. There were 11 incidents of fires, one bomb explosion took place, and in Amritsar, there were two fires, one of them in the building of a high school. Gurgaon had three serious incidents the previous day when a village near Palwal was partly burnt by displaced Meos. Another village Tikli was attacked and burnt by Meos though additional police troops were posted there. There were 20 casualties with 12 dead. Hindus attacked Muslim camel drivers and killed one Muslim.<sup>53</sup> The general situation remained unchanged in Gujranwala. One Muslim was injured by Sikhs in Hoshiarpur; several minor arson cases were reported and a rural fight was controlled by patrol of troops and police. There was one case of attempted arson at Jhang.<sup>54</sup>

In another message Jenkins reported one killed, 19 injured and 23 fires with three bomb explosions in Lahore; There were bomb explosions by non Muslims in Amritsar where Muslims were retaliating by setting houses on fire. Meos burnt down a village at Tauru plateau; fires also erupted in Bharatpur State. The Congress press blamed Muslims for the Gurgaon situation but actually, Meos had suffered more than the Hindus had. Communal murder of Muslims was

reported in Kartarpur, Jullundar on June 18<sup>th</sup>. A mosque in Gurdaspur was set on fire and on June 19<sup>th</sup> some copies of the Holy Quran were burnt. The general situation in the province remained unchanged.<sup>55</sup>

The law and order machinery was reinforced but there was no let up in the disturbances. The administration was tired. Brendon was on leave; he had something like a nervous breakdown. As a show of concern with the victims, the viceroy's wife visited some patients at the Gurgaon hospital on 26<sup>th</sup>.<sup>56</sup>

### **Jinnah and Nehru for Extreme Measures**

In a June 24 message to the Governor of Punjab, Mountbatten said that Mr. Jinnah strongly supported strong measures for suppressing the trouble in Lahore and Amritsar. Nehru too talked in the same vein. He urged a fresh approach to the problem, which might have excellent psychological effect. He suggested that:

- Martial law be declared forthwith in Lahore, Amritsar and other areas;
- The whole operation be handed over to the military, all police be withdrawn ostensibly for rest and recuperation;
- In addition, that the troops should be empowered to be utterly ruthless and to shoot at sight.

Mountbatten agreed with the Indian leaders, and sought Jenkins' consent and asked him to consult the local Military commanders as well. He proposed to raise the matter in the Cabinet the next day before the final announcement.<sup>57</sup>

Philip Zeigler wrote in Mountbatten's official biography that both Nehru and Jinnah urged Mountbatten to take drastic steps to restore order. When Mountbatten refused to allow imposition of martial law-not out of squeamishness but because the Governor assured him that it would merely make things worse- however the Viceroy was abused in the cabinet by representatives of Congress and the League alike. Nehru as usual, completely lost his control and demanded the sacking of every official, from the Governor downwards, that same day. "I [Mountbatten] had to reprimand him publicly for this irresponsible suggestion." To Jenkins, the most sinister feature was that neither the police nor the army could be trusted to perform their duty to quell the disorder. The worst thing was that British officials too were involved in communal division.<sup>58</sup>

In his fortnightly report to Mountbatten, dated 25<sup>th</sup> June, Jenkins explained why the culprits were not being apprehended. He said the rioters acted individually by throwing petrol bombs or stabbed people in lonely narrow streets. The victims of those incidents were all communal entities, Hindu, Muslim and Sikhs.<sup>59</sup>

Martial law would not make much difference, he believed. He thought that extreme measures like shooting at sight might not work but at the same time admitted that his assessment could be wrong. The political leaders did not actually mean that they should be shooting the residents of an area where an outrage had occurred, he thought. The real remedy, according to Jenkins, was genuine efforts by party leaders to stop the trouble not by peace appeals, but by pressure on their own *goondas*; supplemented by better intelligence, more coordinated investigation with speedier justice, especially where the offenders were caught red-handed. Jenkins conveyed Mountbatten his views, in which the Lahore Area Commander, concurred, in reply to a telephone message dated 24<sup>th</sup> June 1947.<sup>60</sup>

The letter dated 26<sup>th</sup> June (Recd. 27<sup>th</sup> June) reported a few casualties in Lahore, incendiaries in Amritsar, but calm in Gurgaon.<sup>61</sup>

Mountbatten to Jenkins on 28<sup>th</sup> June 1947 appreciated Jenkins' efforts in maintaining law and order in the province. Mountbatten was critical of local leaders who put the blame of all wrongs on the British. He sympathised with officers who were doing very well in India and they would have to leave India in the midst of their career. He felt sorry about them and desired to do something good for them, to be able to compensate them in some way. Mountbatten congratulated Jenkins that Congress and Muslim League have both agreed to his proposals and that Jenkins should choose two sets of advisers for East and West Punjab.<sup>62</sup>

### **Communal Tussle soaked in Poison**

The intensity of communal tussle added another aspect of hate and distrust in the form of the scare created by poisoning incidents. The first incidence occurred in the Civil Supplies department. There were reports that a Muslim bought *Sherbet* causing illness and in another complaint about the flour bought by Muslims from a Hindu shop, which was poisoned. There was looting in houses left abandoned by their occupants in Gurgaon, Lahore and Amritsar.<sup>63</sup>

### **July 1947 Partition in Process**

Jenkins reporting to Mountbatten, on 1<sup>st</sup> July 1947 said there were no major incidents in Lahore and Amritsar. Gurgaon was facing problems due to refugees from Bharatpur. There was a bomb explosion at Jullundur in a mosque killing a number of women and Sikhs had planned 8<sup>th</sup> July as a protest day.<sup>64</sup> On July 2<sup>nd</sup>, 1947, Jenkins wrote to Mountbatten that Lahore remained peaceful; however, a bank was looted in Amritsar.<sup>65</sup>

The report of July 3<sup>rd</sup> 1947, included the news that Mamdot had resigned from the Security Committees, formed in compliance with paragraph 5 of his telegram of 25<sup>th</sup> June. Mamdot had sent a long letter to Jenkins complaining of repressive actions against Muslims at Misri Shah. He had claimed that he had played a big role in improving the situation in Lahore. Jenkins objected to Mamdot's non-co-operation and complained that it was against the policy of Jinnah who had demanded "utter ruthlessness" against the culprits irrespective of religion.<sup>66</sup>

On 4<sup>th</sup> July 1947, Mountbatten instructed Jenkins that if local leaders were satisfied with the arrangements of the partition and security committees, then there would be no trouble and they would leave things as they were, if there was a strong demand for change only then it could be reconsidered.<sup>67</sup>

On 9<sup>th</sup> July 1947, Jenkins wrote to Mountbatten and discussed with him the matter of relieving the British troops however; the decision was to be taken by G.H.Q on 17<sup>th</sup> July. Jenkins was fully aware of the resentment in the Punjab about partition.<sup>68</sup>

The same day on 9<sup>th</sup> July 1947, Mountbatten discussed with Jenkins the division of the armed forces. He (Mountbatten) realized Jenkins' difficulties in handling the volatile situation in Punjab but insisted that the work be expedited and troops released. Mountbatten advised Jenkins to consult the Army Commander and do whatever was necessary in that direction.<sup>69</sup>

On 10<sup>th</sup> July 1947, Jenkins revealed to Mountbatten his talks with Giani Kartar Singh who was dissatisfied with the Boundary Commission's Report as it was not to the Sikhs' liking. Jenkins wrote frankly that the boundary problem could be solved in a rational way to start the two provinces peacefully; and that the settlement should be out of court. Both Sikhs and Muslims were making irrational demands, Giani Kartar Singh claiming areas up to Montgomery (Sahiwal) and Muslim leaders demanding areas up to Ambala. Both were adamant in their demands and he anticipated a new armed conflict within few weeks.<sup>70</sup>

Evan Jenkins clearly warned Mountbatten that insistence on "speed" was disastrous for Punjab in his report of 11<sup>th</sup> July 1947. He mentioned that the higher services had virtually disintegrated, which turned professional civil servants into subordinate politicians. In the I.C.S. cadre non-Muslims were not prepared to serve in West Punjab, and only one Muslim was prepared to serve in East Punjab which meant that hatred and suspicion were so undisguised.<sup>71</sup>

Jenkins was not alone in believing that things were being dangerously hurried. The second most important Englishman on the

Subcontinent in 1947, Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck, commenting on the 3<sup>rd</sup> June Plan noted, “Independence in 30 days when it really ought to have been spread over three years...” it was quite absurd.<sup>72</sup>

### **Cracker Flared Communal Trouble at Lahore Railway**

On July 14<sup>th</sup> 1947, Jenkins wrote to Mountbatten that during the first half of July, Lahore and Amritsar remained comparatively calm but so tense even a small mischief could trigger a big riot like the fire cracker incident in a Sikh Canteen at Lahore Railway station turned into a fight in which 32 Sikhs, 1 Muslim and 1 Hindu were injured. Two Sikh died two days later due to their wounds.

Jenkins was worried about rural areas like Gujranwala and Gurgaon. In areas where Sikhs dominated like Amritsar and Taran Muslims were murdered mercilessly. In this case, the aggressors were Sikhs. Jenkins mentioned other similar cases of killing and arson to Mountbatten as well.<sup>73</sup>

On 30<sup>th</sup> July 1947, Jenkins admitted that there was no improvement in the communal situation in Lahore and only little improvement in Amritsar. There were fires, street stabbings, and bomb explosions in which the toll of casualties was high. In incidents, during 21<sup>st</sup> July to 23<sup>rd</sup> July several non-Muslim were murdered. At Amritsar, there was a bomb explosion outside the Sessions Court. Killing of Muslims went unabated. In Gurdaspur, Muslim villages were targeted for killing and looting. Again, the aggressors were all Sikhs. Gurgaon remained quiet due to the presence of troops there. The Sikhs were dissatisfied with the Boundary Commission Reports and they were confused, and did not know what to do.<sup>74</sup>

On 30<sup>th</sup> July 1947, Mountbatten wrote to Jenkins in a telegram that the partition council had discussed the precautionary actions to prevent disturbances before and after 15<sup>th</sup> August. Jenkins was asked to cover the period from 1<sup>st</sup> to 15<sup>th</sup> August by declaration under Punjab Legislation. Accordingly the districts, likely to be affected on either side of the boundary were to be declared as “disturbed areas”.<sup>75</sup>

From the above recommendations of Mountbatten, one could see how meticulous and mindful Mountbatten was in his actions. He worked out things in a calculated way. He was quite sure of the direction his policies were taking, and he made preparations accordingly. He knew it would be a bloody and tumultuous process, so he gave instructions in accordance to that. By analyzing his actions, one could comfortably state that Mountbatten was aware of the turbulent reaction of the communal forces in Punjab and he rushed into that torrent and tried his best to send his own Englishmen safely back home

to England and leaving the communal war of succession take its own course. However, the refugees' movement in large numbers shuttling from one part to another without having any knowledge where the border was located resulted in total chaos.<sup>76</sup>

On 31<sup>st</sup> July 1947, Jenkins wrote to Mountbatten that in response to his telegram of 30<sup>th</sup> July the whole of Punjab was declared as a "disturbed area". He also proposed that the imposition should remain effective even beyond 15<sup>th</sup> August by virtue of section 18 of the Indian Independence Act with the approval of the respective governments of India and Pakistan.<sup>77</sup>

On 4<sup>th</sup> August (11.55 pm) in a telegram message Jenkins informed Mountbatten about the security arrangement in Lahore city and how he deployed the troops in different areas.<sup>78</sup>

In his letter of 4<sup>th</sup> August 1947, Jenkins enclosed a memorandum for which Mountbatten had asked him to prepare about the main criticism against the Punjab Government for its handling of the disturbances. Jenkins admitted it was rather sketchy as he had a good deal of other work on his hands and that most of the material required for a full survey was on record but it would take time to get it arranged.<sup>79</sup> Jenkins had explained his position serial-wise by noting the complaints of the Congress and Muslim League leaders and then explained his limitations in quelling the incendiaries, killing and general disturbance. The account of both the sides is very convincing yet as far as the security and protection of the common people was concerned both the authorities, political and administrative, had miserably failed. They left masses at the mercy of the hooligans. Jenkins blamed the politicians of being callous and unable to grasp the magnitude of the crisis. He blamed the leaders of the three communities for inciting the communal riots. They not only incited but also provided arms and ammunition to their workers.

On 8<sup>th</sup> August 1947, Jenkins discussed the situation in different towns of Punjab, with the Commander of the Punjab Boundary Force and the Inspector General of Police. Jenkins elaborated further that:

The civil side of picture was not encouraging. Transfers and postings connected with partition were going on. Standard of reporting of incidents had fallen off. Police in East Punjab were unsteady and Muslim police officers in Amritsar intended to migrate to West Punjab on 15<sup>th</sup> August. Arrangement for security for public is very precarious. Commander Punjab Boundary Force had told Jenkins the strength of his 5<sup>th</sup> Brigade averages 1500 effective rifles. It meant that the overall strength of say



7500 effective rifles including police, to control 12 districts with a population of no less than 12 million.<sup>80</sup>

Jenkins then asked for more force from the centre to look after Punjab but his demand gone unheard.<sup>81</sup>

### **Tara Singh Arrest Case in Early August 1947**

In the letter dated 9<sup>th</sup> August 1947, Jenkins thanked Mountbatten for his prompt response on dated 8<sup>th</sup> August regarding the subversive activities of Tara Singh and other Sikh leaders. Jenkins thought it was not a good advice to arrest Tara Singh and other Sikh leaders, and the Boundary Commission Report would not improve but worsen the immediate situation. As the Sikhs were likely to create more trouble, the British civil servants were advised to leave the mess for the new government to deal with.<sup>82</sup> Jenkins elaborated that the confinement of the Sikh leaders, not on criminal charges but under his emergency powers, would be most embarrassing and he was not clear where he could put the leaders without instigating trouble and that he could hardly send them to what would in a few days be Pakistani jails. On the other hand, if he left them in East Punjab, it would then be the centre of agitation.<sup>83</sup>

Jenkins had given a number of reasons of not arresting Tara Singh, though evidence was there of his violent activities and planning. Jenkins wrote that he had decided to plan the arrest, but he was against its execution unless he was forced. He knew that it would be difficult to arrest Sikh leaders as they travel and usually rest in places like the Golden Temple, where police action would attract a lot of public attention. Jenkins commented that Jinnah wanted harsh treatment for troublemakers. The British policy was to have smooth transfer of power, even at considerable risk. If Jenkins stirred up the hornet's nest, the new government of Punjab would inherit that animosity and he thought that would not be fair to the new governments. The arrest therefore should not be made unless the action before the transfer of power was quite unavoidable. According to Leonard Mosley, the author of *The Last Days of the British Raj*, Mountbatten conferred with Jenkins and the two designated Governors of East and West Punjab Sir Chandulal Trivedi and Sir Francis Mudie and asked them what their suggestion was. They agreed to leave Tara Singh and his cohorts free. Jenkins maintained that it was of no use arresting Tara Singh in the beginning of August and then releasing him in the mid of August when independence would be declared.<sup>84</sup>

Jenkins in a way wanted the transfer of power to proceed in a calm atmosphere so that the British were not blamed for mishandling the situation and preventing mass murder of the populations and

limiting the warring communal groups to devour each other.\* No judicial inquiry took place against the crimes that were committed from March to August 1947. In any case, Muslims and non-Muslims, who had lived quite peacefully till 1946, could not be wholly blamed for the mayhem which occurred in 1947.

In his letter dated 12<sup>th</sup> August 1947, Jenkins wrote to Mountbatten that a special train had been derailed which had angered the Sikhs in Amritsar. He said he had removed from duty a Hindu Superintendent of Police who had disarmed Muslim policemen without consulting higher authorities. Muslim policemen were indispensable in East Punjab and the British policy was to keep them at their posts. They were threatened that they would lose their jobs in west-Punjab (Pakistan) if they left their job in East Punjab. Lahore was at that time under control of the Muslim League National Guards as the Police was ineffective. The strength of the Punjab Boundary Force was inadequate to handle the law and order situation.<sup>85</sup>

On 12<sup>th</sup> August 1947, Jenkins informed Mountbatten that police in Lahore and Amritsar could not be relied upon. Some police stations in rural areas of Amritsar had ceased working. There were no troops or police available to maintain law and order. The Muslim League National Guard had taken over Lahore and was indulged in hostile acts against the non-Muslims.<sup>86</sup>

In his next letter to Mountbatten Jenkins admitted that Lahore and Amritsar were out of control. Curfew had been enforced. Sikh had been firing from Dera Sahib Gurdwara, which was then searched for seizing the culprits. The Majitha Jatha was punished for firing which reperussion in Amritsar.<sup>87</sup>

In another communiqué of the same date, 13 August 1947, Jenkins merely reported the casualty figures for Punjab.<sup>88</sup>

In the fortnightly report dated 13<sup>th</sup> August, 1947 Jenkins wrote to Mountbatten that communal disturbances had overshadowed everything. Sikhs were very violent and they were killing Muslims in Amritsar, Jullundur, Hoshiarpur, Gurdaspur, while there were isolated outrages in Ludhiana, Lahore and Ferozapore. It was difficult to keep tract of the killings and their number. The machinery of the government was in disarray in anticipation of new governments of India and Pakistan to take over command. Sikhs had gone berserk and were indulging in brutal acts against Muslims.

Muslim policemen were deserting in Amritsar to reach Lahore in safety despite warning from IG Police Qurban Ali Khan that they would not be recruited in West Punjab if they deserted their station of duty. Jenkins explained that the Muslim policemen were targeted in

Amritsar and their lives were in danger in that violent city ruled by Sikh mobs.

The Hindus had kept a low profile during the communal frenzy, as they wanted to migrate to Hindu majority provinces safely. Muslim leaders wanted that Hindus, Sikhs and the British should leave Muslim majority areas, and were using violent means to achieve their objective.<sup>89</sup>

In a telegram on 14<sup>th</sup> August 1947, Jenkins informed about the situation in Lahore and Amritsar. Muslims had attacked two trains in Rawalpindi as a reprisal against Sikh atrocities in Central Punjab. He expected this to be dealt with by the new government.<sup>90</sup>

Mountbatten accelerated the whole process of transfer of power without taking the consequences of simultaneous disruption of all departments and government agencies as well as people in general into consideration, which was bound to result in total disorder and at worse mayhem. The British officers feared the local population would not respect them or listen to them as they were leaving. Mountbatten's callous and hasty decisions played a criminal role in the widespread destruction that accompanied partition.

## **Conclusion**

Wavell chalked out the road map of transfer of power. He had thoroughly studied the ground realities of India. He could see the problems related to partition. Mountbatten was there only to execute that pre-planned schedule. No one could deny that Mountbatten had a penchant for self-aggrandizement; he was not only proud of his royal blood but was overly conscious about it. He wanted to deal with the whole affair of India in a royal way but he lacked that sensitivity where humans were treated with dignity and honour. He was a pompous man, who liked to overawe others by his mannerisms and dress. For the Independence Day celebration, he was fussy about buttons and dresses. He was least concerned about the killing that was going on in Punjab.

The British had done a lot of paperwork, recording incidences and trying to prove that they handled every problem that cropped up efficiently. In reality, they had disturbed the whole process which otherwise would have gone smoothly. They even ridiculed the local leaders, especially Sikhs, when they demanded regions to be included on their side of Punjab.

The author of the memorandum wrote in detail about the fact and figures of communal violence. His stress was how violent the two sides were, i.e., the Muslims and non-Muslims; however, he failed to mention anything about how the British planned to tackle it. The whole government machinery was under British rule. So section 93 of India

Act was applicable in Punjab and under which Jenkins was ruling Punjab. The people's representatives, though elected, could not use their power until they were given authority to execute orders and activate the process of administration.

Jenkins wrote quite innocently that he had no contacts with officials at home. He only sent telegrams on a daily basis to the Secretary of State informing him of the ground realities in his province.<sup>91</sup>

The local leadership of Muslims and non-Muslims were conscious that the British were not handling the communal problem with sagacity. It was the duty of the administration to "nip the evil in the bud" before it turned into a monster. The administrator of the province was fully aware of the trouble mongers but refrained from taking appropriate steps at the required time. Master Tara Singh had declared an open war against Muslims; his poison spitting tongue engulfed the whole of Punjab in turmoil. Jenkins and his subordinates took no action against him. He claimed that he treated everyone equally. He was the only person who was meeting all the communal leaders without discrimination.<sup>92</sup> However, that approach did not solve the problems facing him. H.V. Hodson has very aptly described British Viceroy Mountbatten, "The Viceroy's threats of the most drastic action against law-breakers while he remained responsible were known: the charge was that they remained what they were, merely words."<sup>93</sup>

Jenkins had vividly explained why the British failed to cope with troubled Punjab. He claimed that circumstances were extraordinary, the relationship between the two communal groups was strained, Muslims and non-Muslims both were trying to resist the others' dominance. Jenkins had aptly dubbed it as a "War of Succession". He blamed Muslims and non-Muslims leaders alike for the trouble in Punjab, as according to him they played no role in pacifying the flames of communal disharmony. They were concerned only about their particular community; they did not try to pacify the strained relations with calmness and sympathetic attitudes towards the aggrieved communal segments. In fact, some of those leaders further aggravated the situation by their speeches and actions.

He wrote about Lahore communal riots and Hindu leadership's demand to impose Martial Law in Lahore; he explained that "When a Hindu leader talks about "utter ruthlessness" or "martial law" he meant that he wanted as many Muslims as possible shot out of hand." One can easily be misled by Jenkins' comment that Hindus wanted Muslims to be shot. Jenkins was using the British time-tested strategy of "divide and rule". The fiery speech of Master Tara Singh at the Punjab Secretariat stairs on 2<sup>nd</sup> March 1947 was enough for the administrators

of Punjab to put him behind the bars as he was instigating communal riots in the province, but Jenkins took no action against him. Jenkins explained that he did not want to worsen the already tense atmosphere in the region.<sup>94</sup> The situation in Punjab had forced the worst polarization of the communities with practically all Muslims on one side of the fence and all non-Muslims on the other.

Churchill was critical of Mountbatten's appointment and his handling of Indian affairs. He refused to shake hands with Mountbatten for years and told him, "what you did in India is as though you had struck me across the face with a riding whip." Six years later at the Bermuda conference, he was still upset for giving independence to India. He expressed his sorrow in the presence of the US President, the French Prime Minister and all their advisers on the passing of British Raj in India. He said: "This was a colossal disaster which he had lived to see."<sup>95</sup>

The terrible happenings of partition days still seem to cast their shadow on the future of the two states, but people cannot live in that mode of mutual hatred and distrust forever. Nations have to shed the baggage of the past and move on by overcoming their weaknesses and work out their way for progress and development and the future of the coming generations.

Jenkins never said a word even though he was blamed for the Punjab tragedy. Once when Major General Shahid Hamid met him in London and pressed him (Jenkins) to write his memoirs, he replied that 'it is not in the interest of Commonwealth.' It was known that at that time before his departure on 15<sup>th</sup> August he was ordered by Mountbatten to burn down all his papers concerning Boundary affairs. So there was a bonfire in the cellar of Governor House, Lahore, but still a few papers including the original sketch map demarcating the boundaries between the two Dominions before it was altered by Mountbatten fell into the hands of Sir Francis Mudie, the Governor who gave them to Liaquat, the then Prime-Minister of Pakistan. However, the enigma whether he [Jenkins] kept some papers with him or not remained unclear.<sup>96</sup>

## Reference

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- <sup>1</sup> Nripendra Nath Mitra (ed.), *The Indian Annual Register, Jan-June 1947*, Vol. I (Calcutta: The Annual Register Office, 1948), 119.
- <sup>2</sup> Jenkins to Viceroy; dated 20. 3. 47. Jenkins Paper, IOLR 3/1/176, NDC.MF. no. 1616, 133.
- <sup>3</sup> H. V. Hodson, *The Great Divide: Britain-India-Pakistan* (Karachi: OUP, 2005), 295-299.
- <sup>4</sup> G.Allana (Compiled and edited, *Pakistan Movement: Historic Documents* (Karachi, Paradise Subscription Agency, 1968), 592.
- <sup>5</sup> Ibid., 401.
- <sup>6</sup> Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, *India Wins Freedom* (Lahore: Vanguard, 1988), 207.
- <sup>7</sup> Alex Von Tunzelmann, *Indian Summer: The Secret History of the End of an Empire* (London: Simon & Schuster, 2007), 208.
- <sup>8</sup> Pamela Mountbatten, *India Remembered* (London: Pavilion Roli Books, 2007), 7.
- <sup>9</sup> Lionel Carter (Compiled and ed.), *Punjab Politics 1936-1939: The Start of Provincial Autonomy* (New Delhi: Manohar, 2004), 7.
- <sup>10</sup> *Jenkins Papers*, IOLR/3/1/176, printouts from Microfilm No.1616 (Islamabad: National Documentation Centre, NDC).
- <sup>11</sup> Ibid. Mountbatten replies to Jenkins; dated 29<sup>th</sup> March 1947.
- <sup>12</sup> Rukhsana Zafar (ed.), *Disturbances in the Punjab* (Islamabad: National Documentation Centre, 1995), dated, 31<sup>st</sup> March 1947. 119-22.

- <sup>13</sup> Lionel Carter (ed.), *Punjab Politics 3<sup>rd</sup> March-31<sup>st</sup> May 1947: At the Abyss*, (New Delhi: Manohar, 2007), Jenkins to Mountbatten, 2<sup>nd</sup> April 1947, 113.
- <sup>14</sup> Alan Campbell-Johnson, *Mission with Mountbatten* (London: Robert Hale Limited, 1951), 66.
- <sup>15</sup> Carter, *Punjab Politics*, 117-118. Zafar, *Disturbances in the Punjab*, Jenkins letter to Mountbatten dated 9<sup>th</sup> April 1947. 129.
- <sup>16</sup> Leonard Mosley, *The Last Days of the British Raj* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1961), 215-216. Also see Stanley Wolpert, *Shameful Flight*, 155, 167.
- <sup>17</sup> Carter, *Punjab Politics*, 115-116.
- <sup>18</sup> Ibid., 116.
- <sup>19</sup> Jenkins Papers, IOLR/3/2/17, (available at NDC, Islamabad, from Microfilm No.1616), Mountbatten letter to Jenkins; dated 27<sup>th</sup> April 1947.
- <sup>20</sup> Johnson, *Mission with Mountbatten*, 65. "Operation Solomon" terminology is used settling of Jews at Israel from different parts of world.
- <sup>21</sup> Zeigler, *Mountbatten: The Official Biography* (London: Collin, 1985), 401.
- <sup>22</sup> Carter, *Punjab Politics 3<sup>rd</sup> March-31 May 1947 At the Abyss* (New Delhi: Manohar, 2007), 138. Note by Jenkins sent to Mountbatten, dated 16<sup>th</sup> April, 1947.
- <sup>23</sup> Zafar, (ed.), , *Disturbances in the Punjab*, 170-72.
- <sup>24</sup> Mountbatten Letter to Jenkins, Jenkins Papers, R/3/1/176, 23 April, 1947. Mamdot was requesting that he should be allowed to form ministry in Punjab.
- <sup>25</sup> Nicholas Mansergh, *Transfer of Power*, Vol. X (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1980), 500. Jenkins to Mountbatten, 30<sup>th</sup> April, 1947.
- <sup>26</sup> Ibid., 501.
- <sup>27</sup> Ian Talbot, "Violence, Migration and Resettlement: The Case of Amitsar", in Ian Talbot & Shinder Thandi (ed.), *People on the Move: Punjabi Colonial and Post Colonial Migration* (Karachi: OUP, 2004), 91.
- <sup>28</sup> Carter (ed.), *Punjab Politics*, 306.
- <sup>29</sup> Ibid., 301.
- <sup>30</sup> Ibid., 196.
- <sup>31</sup> Ibid. Jenkins letter to Mountbatten, 15<sup>th</sup> May 1947, 182-83.
- <sup>32</sup> Ibid. Jenkins sent a telegram to Mountbatten, 16 May, 1947, 183. Mentioning that due to tense situation in which 30 were killed, and 57 injured, Gurkha troops were called in to reinforced police.
- <sup>33</sup> Zafar, *Disturbances in Punjab*, 184-185. Mountbatten telegram to Jenkins dated 17<sup>th</sup> May 1947. For full details also see Lionel Carter, *Punjab Politics 3 March-31 May 1947 At the Abyss Governors' Fortnightly Reports and other Key Documents*, (New Delhi, Manohar, 2007). 195-199.
- <sup>34</sup> Ibid. 185.
- <sup>35</sup> Ibid. Mountbatten telegram to Jenkins, dated 17<sup>th</sup> May 1947, 183.
- <sup>36</sup> Lionel Carter, (Compiled and ed.) *Punjab Politics 3<sup>rd</sup> March-31 May 1947 At the Abyss* (New Delhi, Manohar, 2007), 217.

- <sup>37</sup> Zafar, (ed.), *Disturbances in Punjab*, 186-87. Jenkins telegram to Mountbatten dated 18<sup>th</sup> May 1947. Jenkins gave the numbers, that was six dead and two injured and on 18<sup>th</sup> May 1947 in an attack on Gujjar Muslims at Chauburji [a place in Lahore], seven died and twenty were injured. Incendiaries was on large scale continues, Amritsar was tense.
- <sup>38</sup> Ibid., 187. Jenkins wrote a letter to Mountbatten.
- <sup>39</sup> Ibid., 188.
- <sup>40</sup> Ibid. 21<sup>st</sup> May 1947, 190.
- <sup>41</sup> Zafar (ed.), *Disturbances in Punjab*, 196. 24 May, Jenkins telegram to Mountbatten,
- <sup>42</sup> Ibid., 196. Casualties and incidence of incendiaries, there were six dead, thirteen injured and seven incidences reported.
- <sup>43</sup> Ibid., 204.. Jenkins telegram dated 28<sup>th</sup> May (Recd 29<sup>th</sup> May) 1947 to Mountbatten.
- <sup>44</sup> Ibid., 211. In a write up dated 29<sup>th</sup> (Recd. 30<sup>th</sup> May) 1947.
- <sup>45</sup> IOLR/3/1/176, Microfilm No.1616, Jenkins' Paper at NDC, Islamabad. Also see Carter, *Punjab Politics*, 231-232.
- <sup>46</sup> Zeigler, *Mountbatten*, 400.
- <sup>47</sup> Lionel Carter, (ed.) *Punjab Politics 1 June-14 August 1957 Tragedy* (New Delhi: Manohar, 2007), 49. `1<sup>st</sup> June 1947.
- <sup>48</sup> Zafar (ed.), *Disturbances in Punjab*, 228. Jenkins telegram to Mountbatten dated 2<sup>nd</sup> (Recd. 3<sup>rd</sup> June) 1947. Also see Carter (ed.), *Punjab Politics*, 52. Situation report was 7 dead and 14 injured but the list was incomplete. Fire fighting was most difficult and Sapper Demolition Company had to be sent to assist. Two fire engines were also sent from Lahore. Sikhs were attacking rural areas of Amritsar; however, no casualties were reported.
- <sup>49</sup> Ibid., 229. 4<sup>th</sup> June (Recd. 5<sup>th</sup>) 1947. Also see Carter, (ed.), *Punjab PoliticsI*, 53. Situation report of Lahore was five dead and one injured with five fires in Lahore. Amritsar had two communal riots and four fires. Casualties were four dead, nine injured apparently due to police firing.
- <sup>50</sup> Ibid., 8.
- <sup>51</sup> Ibid., 231-32. Jenkins reported on 7<sup>th</sup> June that in Lahore there were 3 killed, 2 wounded and 3 fires, while in Amritsar 2 killed 2 wounded and 9 fires.
- <sup>52</sup> Carter (ed.), *Punjab PoliticsI*, Vol. V, 8.
- <sup>53</sup> Ibid., 8.
- <sup>54</sup> Ibid., 236-37. 15<sup>th</sup> June 1947 Jenkins telegram to Jenkins,
- <sup>55</sup> Ibid., 249-50. In a telegram dated 20<sup>th</sup> (Recd. 21<sup>st</sup> June, 1947) Jenkins narrates.
- <sup>56</sup> Ibid., 256-57. On 22 June, 1947 in a Jenkins letter to Lord Mountbatten, he reports about his visit to Gurgaon.
- <sup>57</sup> Mansergh, *Transfer of Power 1942-47*, Vol. XI, 623-28.
- <sup>58</sup> Zeigler, *Mountbatten*, 401.
- <sup>59</sup> Carter, (ed.) *Punjab Politics*, 99-100.
- <sup>60</sup> Zafar, *Disturbances in Punjab*, 264-68.



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- <sup>61</sup> Ibid., 271.
- <sup>62</sup> Mansergh, *Transfer of Power 1942-47*, Vol.XI, 715.
- <sup>63</sup> Zafar, *Disturbances in Punjab*, 272.
- <sup>64</sup> Ibid., 277-78.
- <sup>65</sup> Ibid., 285. Situation report four Muslims were murdered at Amritsar. Gurgaon situation remained unchanged. There was an explosion at a shrine in Jullundur, murder and arsons at Hoshiarpur, Sialkot and Sargodha.
- <sup>66</sup> Jenkins Papers, (MF.no1616, NDC, Islamabad). Jenkins letter to Mountbatten, dated 1<sup>st</sup> July, 1947.
- <sup>67</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>68</sup> Ibid., 9<sup>th</sup> July 1947
- <sup>69</sup> Ibid. Mountbatten letter to Jenkins dated 9<sup>th</sup> July 1947, IOR R/3/1/176 (MF.no1616, NDC, Islamabad).
- <sup>70</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>71</sup> Jaswant Singh, *Jinnah India-Partition Independence* (New Delhi: Rupa & Co., 2009), 445.
- <sup>72</sup> Raghuvendra Tanwar, *Reporting the Partition of Punjab 1947* (New Delhi: Vanguard, 2006), 36.
- <sup>73</sup> Ibid., 2. Zafar, *Disturbances in Punjab*, 289-91.
- <sup>74</sup> Ibid., 316-18.
- <sup>75</sup> Ibid., 315. Mountbatten to Jenkins dated 30<sup>th</sup> July, 1947.
- <sup>76</sup> Ibid.315-16.
- <sup>77</sup> Ibid. 318-19.
- <sup>78</sup> Nicholas Mansergh, *Transfer of Power 1942-47*, Vol. XII, (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1983) 531.
- <sup>79</sup> Ibid. 510.
- <sup>80</sup> Mansergh, *Transfer of Power*, Vol.XII, 583-584. Jenkins' Letter to Mountbatten.
- <sup>81</sup> Zafar, *Disturbances in Punjab*, 328-29.
- <sup>82</sup> Ibid., 330-31. Telegram No.3268-S.
- <sup>83</sup> Ibid., 331.
- <sup>84</sup> Mosley, *The Last Days of the British Raj*, 215.
- <sup>85</sup> Mansergh, *TOP, 1942-47*, Vol.XII, 674-75.
- <sup>86</sup> Ibid. 688. On 12<sup>th</sup> August (Recd. 13 August) 1947.
- <sup>87</sup> Ibid. 709. \*See Lionel Carter, *Punjab Politics 1 June-14 August 1947 Tragedy*, 232. Also see *TP*, Vol. XII, Jenkins letter to Mountbatten, 13 August 1947, para 7, 700-704.
- <sup>88</sup> Zafar (ed.), *Disturbances in Punjab*, 338-39. 13 August 1947, 11.40 a.m. received at 9:00 p.m. on 14 August, gave merely casualty figures in Punjab.
- <sup>89</sup> Ibid., 339-43.
- <sup>90</sup> Ibid., 344.
- <sup>91</sup> Mansergh, *Transfer of Power 1942-47*, Vol. XII, 511.
- <sup>92</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>93</sup> Hodson, *The Great Divide*, 340.
- <sup>94</sup> Ibid., 512.
- <sup>95</sup> Clive Ponting, *Churchill*, (London: Sinclair-Stevenson, 1994), 742.

<sup>96</sup> Shahid Hamid, *Disastrous Twilight* (London: Leo Cooper, 1986), 235.