

BRITISH PUNJAB: POLITICS OF PATRONAGE

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Abstract

The history of the Punjab is replete with invasions and conquests by the foreigners. Years before Christ, the Punjab witnessed the invasion of Alexander the Great,¹ and after that many other invaders followed till the mid nineteenth century, when the British conquered this land of five rivers.² The enormous richness attracted the large number of invaders. Mughals were the rulers of the India and the province of Punjab was under the Sikhs. How were these powers weakened and the British took over? Karl Marx describes in his words in 'The Tribune': "The paramount power of the great Mughals was broken by the British Viceroys. The Marhattas broke the power of the Viceroys. The power of the Marhattas was broken by the Afghans, and while all were struggling against all, the Briton rushed in and were enabled to subdue them all".³

Key words

British, colonialism, divide and rule, *jagirs*, moneylenders, Mian Fazl-i-Husain, *pirs*, Urban Hindus, Choudhary Chhotu Ram.

Introduction

At that point in history, while British were conquering parts of India, they were losing ground in their American colonies.⁴ Why really did they succeed in one and failed in another, at the same time? The most striking reason, among others, could be that the Americans were united in their war against the colonialism, while on the other hand, the sons of India, apart from having a history of being accustomed to be ruled by others, were not united and were in fact at daggers drawn against each others.⁵ The British expertly used the Indian tradition of internal squabbles and intrigues to their favour. All the victories, beginning with the Palasy in 1757⁶ to successfully crushing the war of Independence in 1857,⁷ owe their mark to the skilful use of "divide and rule" policy of the British. The technique or the method, originally used by the East India Company, was then utilized by the successor British

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Indian Government. Placing one prince against the other, one community against the other, one interest group against the other, one religion against the other, one race against the other and one state against the other, was masterly done to prevent any chances of Indian people to become united against the British masters. It was meticulously carried out as the British had recently experienced the consequences of not doing that in their American colonies. The history witnessed use of the policy of divide and rule in the other parts of British Indian Empire, and the province of Punjab was no exception. It had the peculiar religion wise break down, which helped the British to utilise the natural division to their advantage. Promotion of Punjab National Unionist Party under the British auspices further helped them to achieve their goal.

A glance over the map of Punjab and northern India shows an interesting feature, that of the five rivers flowing through the province like five fingers of a hand.⁸ In the high mountains, the fingers are separated and as we travel downwards, they join each other in the southern Punjab and form a wrist, which then flows into Sindh, the adjoining province. The politics of the Punjab was very much analogue to the physical feature of rivers' course. On the atlas pages the rivers confluence to form one⁹---under the dictates of altitude, depression of land and other topographical features, while on the pages of history, three major communities¹⁰ of the province joined hands and to a great extent confluenced to the Punjab National Unionist Party. Despite divide and rule policy of the British in rest of India, unionism was not only developed but also dominated the politics of the province for over two decades.

Keeping in view the potential of rural areas as army recruiting centers, the British started patronizing rural population and not only developed canal colonies but also awarded large *jagirs* to people loyal to them. The reasons behind the promotion of rural people could be traced out from the following extract:

A variety of considerations, some internal some external, combined to induce the British to look to the villages. Indian administrative circumstances served to rivet their attention firmly on the village. It was here too that a handful of alien rulers could find some semblance of mass support, some token of acquiescence or goodwill and some cultural traits that struck a responsive chord in Victorian hearts. By contrast the British were administratively less concerned with the towns, the urban areas did not appear to provide a mass base, or an easily

satisfied class ready to extend loyalty. And culturally the towns were entirely alien, striking no spark in the British imagination, and perhaps arousing considerable offence at times.¹¹

Moreover, the identity of province of being the sword arm of India was mainly dependent upon the recruits coming from rural areas of the province and again agriculturist tribes were in reality, producing the soldiers for the British Indian Army. The fact that army was very largely recruited from landholding tribes seemed to be a further assurance that courage and character were agricultural *monopolies*.¹² It was almost as if Punjab society was village society and it was assumed that the political forces that prevailed within village must necessarily prevail within the province.¹³ Besides the fiscal dynamics of the government were directly related to the rural subjects of the province. Van den Dungen has noted that:

An administration dependent very largely on the payment of land revenue¹⁴ by numerous small landed proprietors must take particular care of its revenue payers, so that much of the time, the thoughts and energies of its servants must be centred on the village rather than the town. The British officers were brought into closer contact with the village and acquired a more intimate knowledge of village society.¹⁵

Another aspect of British patronage of the rural people was psychological as in towns, relatively educated and rich people did not use to offer the respect to the rulers, which the rural subjects were always prepared to offer. Furthermore, "it was comparatively easy to satisfy the needs of landholders, wanting little but tolerable".¹⁶ On the other hand, towns' demands were high and their proportion of revenue generation was comparatively low.

Although the British had started supporting the agriculturalist classes from the very start of their rule in the province, uplift of those classes naturally demanded time. With the British actions in support of agriculturist tribes, the marketable value of land ensued. Therefore, agricultural indebtedness became possible on hitherto unknown scale. As the land had become valuable and transferable, indebtedness assumed unprecedented forms. Moneylender classes were offering the loans on compound interest, which in most cases soared so high that landowners were unable to repay it. And the only option they were left to wipe the slate clean, was the transfer of land to the party they owed money to. During the last three decades of the nineteenth century, such transfers of lands assumed even more serious proportions. In many

cases, Hindu traders and moneylenders were prominent among those who had acquired the land through these means. The agricultural indebtedness was unknown even in the early 1860s¹⁷ but once it started, the scale during the last third of the century was alarming. This destabilizing situation was keenly observed by the British as noted by Dungen:

At the heart of the Punjab political tradition laid the desire to create and preserve a stable rural base. A study of British attitudes to voluntary land transfer thus illuminates the major problem of political authority in the Punjab as ensured by the British in the nineteenth century. The story began in a sense, with Brandreth. In his revenue report for 1868-9 Brandreth¹⁸...stressed the political danger of the voluntary transfer of land from hereditary landholders to the Hindu trading castes.¹⁹

Although the consequences of this development were revolutionary yet there existed no mechanism to check it. Even "the British civil courts provided the moneylenders of the province with regular facilities of a kind hitherto quite unknown, for enforcing the payment of debts".²⁰ But once the problem was identified, the British authorities were keen to solve it.

It was feared that the expropriation of land owning tribes by moneylenders would create a discontented agricultural class, which would be ready for violence against the moneylenders, and at the least not averse to political change. Agrarian discontent, many officers believed, could easily turn into hatred for the government, which encouraged expropriation by the authority, which its civil courts gave to the moneylenders. In some parts of the country officers already perceived various symptoms of agrarian discontent; in other parts they felt that if nothing was done the growth of such discontent was inevitable.... One officer remembering one of the causes of the mutiny stressed that events that make the agriculturist population dissatisfied also make the army dissatisfied. There was however, general anxiety lest one day a crisis should come and the executive be weakened, perhaps through a threat from outside and the whole fabric of British order and power in countryside collapse.²¹

The problem, therefore, in the British eyes, was not just the survival of the landowner classes but it was in fact of the loyal subjects of the British government. It was these agriculturist tribes from where the British were getting the revenue, military recruitments and political support that was as necessary and vital for their rule as is the air, water

and food for living. In the words of Ibbetson,²² a British Indian civil servant,

“...political considerations outweighed everything else in India. In England popular discontent meant only change of Ministers and an alteration of the law; in India it meant disloyalty”.²³

In late 1880's, there were far more officers, than were in 1870's, who believed that the land alienation process involved “...grave political danger or evils”.²⁴ And this danger or evil was, in fact, the threat to the very existence of the British Government, in case if they not only lose the support of agriculturalist tribes but also invite their wrath upon them for not tackling issue in their favour. Thus “conscious of their isolation and their numerical inferiority, the British were induced to think in terms of mass support for their rule”.²⁵ And this support was far easier to come from the rural Punjab, and not from the urban section of the province.

The landowners, various officers pointed out, represented a political force in the country, and were being displaced by moneylenders, men of no political significance. The land owning tribes were the foundation of British rule; they had a vast superiority in numbers; they supplied the manpower for the native army; they were the hereditary proprietors of the soil; they were, in many cases warlike with traditions and a history; they were sturdy, courageous and independent; and if discontented and given an opportunity they would fight. They were, as Throburn²⁶ put it in 1886,

‘the people of India’; and two years before, writing about the western Punjab, he had even apprehended that a hostile agrarian movement might take up a cry dear to liberal sentiment, that of ‘the land for the people’. On the other hand, the trading castes contributed nothing to the stability of the state and little to its revenues. Their numbers were insignificant and they were feeble in spirit and physique. They were both feared and despised by the landowners whose social inferiors they had often been before British rule. Far from being able to fight, the trading castes required protection, so that they were a source of weakness rather than strength in time of danger. And in any case, their loyalty to Government was only doubtful.²⁷

The British, after the careful analysis of the whole affair, decided to tackle the issue and formulated the Land Alienation Act to check the alienation of land from agricultural to non-agricultural tribes,

thereby blocking the change, which was to affect the political condition in the province. Punjab Land Alienation Act was a big favour of British to the land owning classes. But this favour was not the end of the process. It was in fact a beginning of new political era. The patronage went on, as M. F. O Dwyer,²⁸ said

“throughout my term in office, I did what I could to further the interest of rural masses, whom I regarded as the basis of stability and prosperity of the province”.²⁹ “the races that count were...the races that can fight”. Even³⁰ at the time of debate over the Reforms Scheme,³¹

Dwyer was against

“the transfer of such wide powers to a small class of politicians, mainly urban, who were not in any sense either representative of the rural masses or sympathetic to their needs and interests”.³²

O’ Dwyer’s voice did not go into oblivion and the council proposed by Montague-Chelmsford Reforms was highly biased in favour of land owning classes. Out of sixty-four general seats, fifty-one were allocated to the rural areas of the Punjab. And the four,³³ out of seven special seats were also reserved for the landholders of the province. As the result of election demonstrated,³⁴ the government achieved what it desired. Partly for the All India Congress’ inactiveness and partly for the zeal of landholders, combined with the favour of rulers bestowed upon them, the Legislative Council formed as a result of December 1920 elections³⁵ was highly rural in character.

“Of 71 elected members, there were only 15 elected members who could be regarded as townsmen, and even of these 15, 10 were landowners”.³⁶

Muslims formed the largest group of thirty-five members. Among the other groups, the non-Muslim group captured twenty-one, of which thirteen were rural. The Sikhs got twelve seats, of which eleven were rural. Therefore the results dictated a coalition of various groups with the dominance of Muslims. The Lieutenant Governor of Punjab Maclagan,³⁷ appointed Fazl-i-Husain and Harkishan Lal³⁸ as ministers. These appointments and cordial relationship of government with the rural members laid down the foundation of an alliance, which was to continue for the next two decades to dominate the politics of the province. The Council formed under the Montague-Chelmsford Reforms, and subsequent appointment of ministers brought new politicians like Mian Fazl-i-Husain to the forefront of political horizon of the province. Mian Fazl-i-Husain, a lawyer, was a former member of Congress and had left the party on the issue of Non-Cooperation.³⁹ Just

after the inception of Council he was quick to read that the power lied with the rural Muslim members.⁴⁰ But still the graphic representation of the newly formed Council dictated an alliance of Muslims with the non-Muslim members of the Council.

On realizing this, Mian Fazl-i-Husain formed an alliance of the Muslim members who were representatives of countryside of the province. This alliance was known as the Rural Block.⁴¹ Soon this group transcended from the religious boundary of Muslim-hood and absorbed rural Hindus and Sikhs as well. According to Azim Husain⁴² the main purpose of this multi-communal alliance was to help “backward areas, backward classes and backward communities”.⁴³

For the Unionist leaders, the aims and objectives of the party were the uplifting of the rural backward classes, as demonstrated the letter of Shahabud-Din⁴⁴ to Mian Fazl-i-Husain, which listed the objectives of the party as following:

1. To develop national self-respect lawfully and constitutionally;
2. To provide equal facilities and opportunities to the backward classes and areas;
3. To promote and protect the interests of the masses without undue encroachment on the interests of capitalists, big land holders and moneylenders;
4. To reconstruct and reorganize the agricultural and industrial life of the province economically and commercially;
5. To effect rural uplift by infusing the real and enlightened spirit of the village community and making every village a unit of true social and national life;
6.
 - i) To secure purity of administration and reduce its cost consistently with efficiency;
 - ii) To distribute fairly and equitably the burden of taxation;
 - iii) To secure funds for promoting and developing beneficial activities;
7. To preserve and protect the religious, cultural⁴⁵ and social integrity of each community;
 - ii) To treat all communities alike and to see that no community dominates the other community; and
 - iii) To infuse the spirit of mutual goodwill, co-operation and tolerance and thus to prevent the creation, and to settle amicably, when created, all

religious, communal or social differences and disputes; and

8. To work out the Reforms, despite their being unsatisfactory and imperfect, and to make strenuous efforts to obtain good results from them.⁴⁶

There were different views regarding the establishment of the Unionist Party. It has been argued that Mian Fazl-i-Husain's intention in founding the party was to use it as a tool to uplift the lot of the overwhelming rural population of the province, which was not able to compete with the educated towns. One argument regarding Fazl-i-Husain's intentions for establishing the party maintains that he established it deliberately on non-communal basis so that he could maintain himself as a Punjab leader, however, the arithmetic of the province certainly had its role in this regard. The Muslims of Punjab were not in a position to rule the province independent of the support of the other communities, since in the Punjab, the Muslim population only marginally exceeded the Hindu and the Sikh populations combined.⁴⁷

It has to be conceded that the political situation in the Punjab was very special and needed special treatment. Until the programme of partitioning the province on communal lines was accepted, it was inconceivable that a communal government in the Punjab could be instituted⁴⁸ and enabled to enjoy stability.⁴⁹

Therefore, apprehending the Punjab situation and the danger of things going out of control if the urban classes were given the lead in provincial politics, British decided to institutionalise agricultural and non-agricultural tribes division, and considered this factor in the Montague-Chelmsford Reforms. Even before 1919 Reforms the division of agricultural and non-agricultural was formalized in the Punjab Land Alienation Act. David Gilmartin pointed out that

“At the heart of the Land Alienation Act, lay a defence of a structure of rural power based on landed patronage and the ‘Tribal’ structure of the British Administration”.⁵⁰

British, in the Punjab, did not promote division of population on the basis of religion. As their reports on the subject indicated that the Land Alienation Act was not about the “question of Moslem versus Sikh and Hindu, but a question of rural versus urban”.⁵¹ They were not hesitant in their official correspondence, to claim that they were the people who had “invented” the policy of promoting agricultural tribes.⁵²

It was under this necessity of the British that Unionist ideology was carved out.⁵³ The National Unionist Party, established in 1923⁵⁴, was essentially a defence of the tribal categorization propounded by the British. It was for these reasons, that opponents of the Land Alienation Act and the Unionist Party alleged that, “Land Alienation Act is to them what the Vedas⁵⁵ and Holy Quran⁵⁶ are to the Hindus and the *Musalman*s”⁵⁷ respectively. On the contrary, the Unionists projected themselves as “non-communal, non-tribal and non-residential” organization working for the “uplift of the poor and the weak”.⁵⁸ Before launching the party, its founder Mian Fazal-i-Hussain said in the Punjab Legislative Council: “The principle that I stand by is the principal of helping the backward community irrespective of their religion, be they Muslims, Hindus or Sikhs.”⁵⁹

Despite these claims, Mian Fazl-i-Husain, the founder of the party, had clear leaning to the Muslim community’s interests, and as a minister, he took many steps for the uplift of the Muslims of the province. This policy was severely criticised by other communities’ non-unionist politicians. Unionist leaders of other communities were not much vocal about such developments as for them the main objective was the defence of the *zamindars*, an interest which was equally shared by Mian Fazl-i-Husain. Choudhary Chhotu Ram, the co-founder of the party, despite his initial leaning towards *Arya Samaj*, was soon swayed by the passion to defend his own agriculturist class.⁶⁰ According to Talbot, Choudhary Chhotu Ram stood for “ruralist populism”⁶¹, to unite the agriculturalists against the moneylenders.

In fact the multi-communal alliance of the Unionists was about the protection of the interests of a class. Gilmartin pointed out that “At the heart of the Unionist position, was the desire to establish political control over the forces of the market”⁶². Mian Fazl-i-Husain and Chaudhary Chhotu Ram shared the point to protect the interests of the rural classes, but they were different at some points as well. Chhotu Ram made no bones about class biases⁶³ and he took lead in the Legislate Council to counter rural indebtedness, essentially a rural cause. While Mian Fazl-i-Husain, apart from defending the interests of rural classes of Muslims and non-Muslims alike, was also bent upon winning the hearts of Muslim community living in the towns. His desire to be a recognised leader of the Muslims could not go into oblivion, despite his unionist politics.⁶⁴ But he faced staunch opposition for his acts of uplifting the Muslim community. Ultimately the

stronger political currents were bound to overtake events in the province. The attempt to blend elements that were essentially incompatible was not the only flaw in the unionist strategy. The other major drawback was the dependency of the unionists on the local kinship networks, governmental support and the support of influential personalities, rather than developing a popular base.⁶⁵

Among other influential personalities, Unionists also made hectic efforts to convince '*pirs*'⁶⁶ to join hands with them. The influence and importance of *pirs* in the political life of Punjab was not the Unionist's invention. *Pir's* inclination towards Government had been common in the past. A report in 1919 highlights it as "... the *pirs* of the chief Mohammadan shrines in the Punjab assembled at Lahore, and expressed their sense of loyalty to Government and their condemnation of the recent disturbances."⁶⁷ Mushtaq Ahmed Gurmani's letter to Mian Fazl-i-Husain reveals the keenness of Unionists to seek the support of *pirs*.⁶⁸ Regarding the strategy formulation for election 1937, Gurmani wrote:

I am in full agreement with your suggestion that a statement should be issued from the important *pirs*⁶⁹ of the province in support of the Unionist Party.

Ahmad Yar showed me your note yesterday and I gave him a list of the *pirs* who have influence in various districts. I am enclosing a copy of that list for your perusal. In my opinion the following *pirs* should be approached to issue the statement:

1. *Dewan Sahib* of Pakpattan
2. *Sajjada Nashin Sahib* of Mahar Sharif (Bahawalpur State)
3. *Sajjada Nashin Sahib* of Taunsa Sharif (Dera Ghazi Khan)
4. *Sajjada Nashin Sahib* of Sial Sharif, Distt. Shahpur
5. Khawaja Ghulam Nizam-ud-Din *Sahib* of Taunsa Sharif
6. *Pir Sahib* of Golra Sharif, District Rawalpindi
7. *Pir Fazl Shah Sahib* of Jalalpur, Dist. Jehlum
8. *Pir Lal Badshah* of Mukhand (Dist. Attock)
9. *Sajjada Nashin Sahib* of Sultan Bahu (Dist. Jhang)
10. *Pir Sahib* of Pir Kot (Dist. Jhang)
11. Khan Bahudar Mukhdum Murid Hussain Qurashi of Multan
12. Khan Bahadur Makhdum Saddar-ud-Din Shah *Sahib* Gilani of Multan
13. *Pir Mohammad Hussain Shah Sahib* of Sher Garh
14. *Pir Jamaat Ali Shah Sahib* of Alipur Sharif (Dist. Sialkot)
15. *Pir Sahib* of Maira Sharif, District Rawalpindi.⁷⁰

In his letter Gurmani further noted:

It would be a good thing if we could also have the signatures of the *sajjada Nashin sahib* of Ajmer, *Sajjada Nashin sahib* of Piran Kaliar, District Saharanpur (UP) and Khawaja Hassan Nizami Sahib of Dehli.⁷¹ I would also suggest that other *Pirs* and *Sajjada Nashins* who have local influence in districts and the constituencies should be approached for support.⁷²

The contents of the letter show that how careful the top brass of Unionists was in securing the support of *pirs*. It is also to be noted here that it was not only the *pirs* of Punjab whose support was sought, but also the *Pirs* from out side the province were approached to influence the voters in Punjab. Although the Unionist strategy of dependency upon influential personalities worked for them, yet the cross-communal alliance of Unionists faced staunch opposition from hardliner of all the three major communities of Punjab, namely the Muslims, Hindus and the Sikhs. Unionists heavily relied upon the class created by the Land Alienation Act. But for the communitarian activists the whole notion of politics based on tribalism was challenging and revolting. Because for them “claims to political leadership” as Gilmartin put it, “had to be based on religion or political principles”.⁷³

Not sharing the views of communitarian politicians, Mian Fazl-i-Husain, envisioned an India, and also a Punjab, where no religious distinctions were made as the ideal. In a speech he had tried to counter ‘Indian first, or Muslim first’ debate. He said;

“I am a Muhammadan and an Indian at one and the same time. I am one indivisible entity and I can’t be one thing at one time and another one later on”.⁷⁴

But this position of Mian Fazl-i-Husain, of being a Muslim and Indian at the same time, could not win confidence of conservative Hindus, who saw him as a Muslim communalist. His appointment as education Minister in the Punjab and his success in getting Lal Chand,⁷⁵ a rural Hindu as a minister, alarmed many Hindus. The *Mahasabhites* Hindus launched a well organized campaign against Lal Chand and finally succeeded to force him to resign.⁷⁶ Urban Hindus also launched campaign against Fazl-i-Husain for his reform program as minister. These reforms of Fazl-i-Husain were regarding the improvement of the educational condition of the Muslim community by offering scholarships and special quotas for them. But as education was vital in securing British employment, Husain’s attempts to award the Muslims their due share, brought him in direct confrontation with the urban Hindus.

References

- ¹Budha Parkash, "Political and Social Movements in Ancient Punjab (Lahore: Aziz Publishers, 1976), pp.164- 178
- ²S. Qalb-i-Abid, Op.Cit., p.30
- ³Karl Marx, The Tribune, August 08, 1853, quoted in J. Hussain, "A History of The Peoples of Pakistan Towards Independence" (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1997), p.270
- ⁴British had occupied American lands, but when they were advancing in India they were receding in America
- ⁵Humayun Mirza, *From Plassy to Pakistan* (Lahore: Ferozsons pvt. Ltd., 1999), p.329
- ⁶J. Hussain, *A History of The Peoples of Pakistan Towards Independence* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1997), p.264
- ⁷Shafique Ali Khan, *Two Nation Theory* (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1973), pp.153-154
- ⁸Christine Osborne, "Pakistan" (New York: Longman, 1983), p.29
- ⁹Rivers Sutlej, Bias, Ravi, Chenab and Jehlem combine in their course and then join Indus, to form one whole while flowing towards the Arabian Sea
- ¹⁰They were Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs
- ¹¹Van den Dungen, *The Punjab Tradition* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1972), p.299
- ¹²It was not only about courage and character of Punjabis that helped them in fighting but they were also physically fit for the purpose. Umar Hayat, father of the last premier of united Punjab encapsulated this argument in the Council of State, in March 1922, in these words: "If a cart horse is put in a race it will not do and similarly if a race horse is put on to a cart, it cannot pull cart. If a person is weak, he is unable to stand the cold and dies; the theory of the 'survival' of the fittest is correct. There are some places where there are people with limbs like our fingers. How on earth can they fight"? Source for the text of speech: Ian Talbot, "Khizr Tiwana: The Punjab. Unionist Party and the Partition of India (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 53
- ¹³Van den Dungen, Op.Cit., p.171
- ¹⁴Ibid, p.172
- ¹⁵Van den Dungen, Op.Cit., p.172
- ¹⁶Ibid, p. 172
- ¹⁷Remarks of Forsyth, C. R Lahore, quoting Brandreth on Gujranwala district, ERR, 1861-2 p.48; paras 190,124,289,299,300, quoted in Van den Dungen, "The Punjab Tradition", Op. Cit, p.33
- ¹⁸He was Commissioner Multan Division then
- ¹⁹Van den Dungen, Op.Cit., p.31
- ²⁰Ibid, p.34
- ²¹Ibid, pp.169-170
- ²²Ibid, pp.160-171
- ²³Van den Dungen, Op.Cit., p.169

²⁴Ibid, p.168

²⁵Ibid, p.171

²⁶British Indian Civil Servants and also Financial Commissioner of Punjab. He wrote books on Punjab as “The Punjab in Peace And War” and “Asiatic Neighbours”,etc.

²⁷Van den Dungen, Op.Cit., p.169

²⁸M. F. O’ Dwyer was Governor of Punjab. He was also author of “India As I Knew it”.

²⁹M. O’ Dwyer, *India As I Knew It 1885-1925* (London: 1926), p.171

³⁰Ibid, p. 417

³¹It refers to Montague-Chelmsford Reforms of 1919

³²M. O’ Dwyer, Op. Cit., p.99

³³S. Qalb-i-Abid, Op. Cit., p.33

³⁴Ibid, p.33

³⁵Ibid, p. 33

³⁶S. Qalb-i-Abid, Op. Cit., p.33

³⁷Sir Edward D. Maclagan was Governor of the Punjab from 1919 to 1924

³⁸He was ex-Congress leader. He was appointed minister in the Punjab after 1920 elections.

³⁹It was Congress’ movement launched in 1920.

⁴⁰Azim Husain, *Fazl-i-Husain: A Political Biography* (Bombay: Longmans, 1946), p.151

⁴¹“Rural Bloc was the brain child of ... Sir Fazl-i-Husain” Raguvendhra Tanwar, Op. Cit., P.52

⁴²Azim Husain was son of Mian Fazl-i -Husain

⁴³Azim Husain, Op. Cit., p.151

⁴⁴ Sir Shahab-ud-Din occupied important position in the Unionist Party. He worked as President Legislative Council Punjab, and speaker of Punjab Legislative Assembly. He also held the portfolio of education in Punjab Government, 1936-7

⁴⁵Sic.

⁴⁶Waheed Ahmad, ed., *Letters of Mian Fazl-i-Husain* (Lahore: Research Society of Pakistan, 1976), pp.485-486

⁴⁷Ibid, p.485-86

⁴⁸Although Muslim League got majority seats in Punjab in 1946 elections, but for the demographic and highly charged communal atmosphere, she was not given the right to form her ministry in the province

⁴⁹Waheed Ahmad, ed., Op. Cit., p.

⁵⁰David Gilmartin, ., Op. Cit., , p. 28

⁵¹Punjab Land Alienation Papers, N.D.C, P.06

⁵²Ibid, p. 27

⁵³British had highlighted rural urban divide in the province. To fulfil their need of a peaceful Punjab they carved out ideology of unionism

⁵⁴Ian Talbot, Op. Cit., p. p.82

⁵⁵Vedas is holy book for Hindus

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- ⁵⁶Quran is holy book of Muslims
- ⁵⁷Raja Narendra Nath, quoted in David Gilmartin, "Empire and Islam", Op. Cit., p.115
- ⁵⁸Sir Fazl-i-Husain's statement of April 19, 1936, quoted in Iftikhar Haider Malik, *Sikander Hayat Khan: A Political Biography* (Islamabad; National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, 1985), pp.160-161
- ⁵⁹Punjab legislative Council Debate, vol.Iv, March 15, 1923, p.1318
- ⁶⁰H.L. Agnihotri and Shiva N. Malik, *A Profile in Courage* (New Delhi: Light and Life Publishers, 1978), p.68
- ⁶¹Ian Talbot, Op. Cit., p.58
- ⁶²David Gilmartin, Op. Cit., p.125
- ⁶³H.L. Agnihotri and Shiva N. Malik, Op. Cit., p.68
- ⁶⁴In a note in his diary dated Nov. 12, 1901, Fazl-I-Husain described his ambition 'to be the recognised leader of the Indian Muslims and sit in the House of Commons as the Right Honourable Gentleman from the Punjab'. Source: Waheed Ahmad, *Letters of Mian Fazl-I-Husain* (Lahore: Research Society of Pakistan, 1978), p.
- ⁶⁵The only exception was Choudhary Chhotu Ram's Zamindara League.
- ⁶⁶Pir means saint
- ⁶⁷Report on the Punjab Disturbances, 1919, IOR L/P&S/ 20 F 205
- ⁶⁸It was not just 1937 elections that Unionists approached pirs, but they did it in 1923, 1937 and also in 1946. Though in the last case they could not succeed in securing their support.
- ⁶⁹Emphasis Added
- ⁷⁰Waheed Ahmad, Op.Cit.,p.24
- ⁷¹It is to be noted here that Ajmer, Delhi and Piran Kaliar were outside Punjab, but even their cooperation was considered worth helping. This strengthens the view that Punjab had impact of outside forces as well.
- ⁷²Waheed Ahmad, Op. Cit.,p.34
- ⁷³David Gilmartin, Op. Cit., p.37
- ⁷⁴Azim Husain, Op. Cit., p.90
- ⁷⁵Lal Bahadur Shastri after 1923 elections. But he was found guilty of electoral malpractice and was unseated from Council, within less than six months Chand was appointed minister of elections.
- ⁷⁶S. Qalbi-Abid, Op. Cit., p.83